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Case Comments

Decisions of International and Foreign Tribunals
MALCOLM W. MONROE,* Departmental Editor
International Court of Justice
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium vs
Spain) (New Application, 1962), International Court of Justice Communiqu6 No. 70/2, 5 February 1970; IX International Legal Materials (March
1970) 227. Barcelona Traction was incorporated in 1911 in Toronto, Canada, where it has its head office. For the purpose of creating and developing an electric power production and distribution system in Catalonia,
Spain, it formed a number of subsidiary companies, and, in 1936, the group
thus constituted supplied the major part of Catalonia's electricity requirements.
According to the Belgian Government, some years after the First World
War Barcelona Traction's share capital came to be very largely held by
Belgian nationals, but the Spanish Government contended that the Belgian
nationality of the shareholders had not been proven.
In 1948, in circumstances set out at some length in the judgment of the
court, the Spanish court of Reus (Province of Tarragona) declared Barcelona Traction bankrupt, and ordered the seizure of its assets and of the
assets of two of its subsidiaries. There followed a series of measures which
finally led to the creation of new shares of the various subsidiaries and their
sale by public auction (1952). The purchaser was a Spanish company,
Fuerzas Electricas de Cataluna, S.A. (FECSA).
Proceedings in which Belgium claimed reparation from Spain for damages sustained by the Belgian shareholders of the company, were instituted
before the Spanish courts without success, and representations were made
to the Spanish Government by several other governments, after which the
Belgian Government referred the dispute to the International Court of
Justice in 1958.
The Belgian Government gave notice of discontinuance of the proceed*B.A. (1940) and LL.B. (1942), Tulane University School of Law; partner, Deutsch,
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ings in 1961, with a view toward negotiations between the representatives
of the private interests concerned but, these negotiations having failed, that
Government filed a new application with the Court in 1962.
The Court first addressed itself to the question of the right of Belgium to
exercise diplomatic protection of Belgian shareholders in a company incorporated in Canada, the measures complained of having been taken not
in relation to any Belgian national, but to the company itself.
The Court observed that when a State admitted foreign investments or
foreign nationals into its territory, it was bound to extend the protection of
the law to them and to assume obligations concerning the treatment to be
afforded them. Such obligations were not absolute, however, and in order
to bring a claim in respect to the breach of such an obligation, a state must
first establish its right to do so.
When the question is one of an unlawful act committed against a company representing foreign capital, the general rule of international law
authorizes the state of the company alone to exercise diplomatic protection
for the purpose of seeking redress. No rule of international law confers
such a right on the shareholder's state.
It has been maintained that a state may assert a claim when investments
by its nationals abroad -such investments being part of a state's national
economic resources- were prejudicially affected in violation of the right of
the state itself to have its nationals enjoy claimed treatment. But, the Court
held, on the facts before it, such a right could only result from a treaty or
special agreement, and no such instrument was in force between Belgium
and Spain.
It had also been maintained that, for reasons of equity, a state should be
permitted, in certain cases, to assert the protection of its nationals, shareholders in a company which had been the victim of a violation of international law. The Court considered that the adoption of the theory of
diplomatic protection of shareholders as such, would open the door to
competing claims on the part of different states, which could create an
atmosphere of insecurity in international economic relations. The Court
concluded that in the particular circumstances of the case before it, when
the company's state could act, jus standi was not conferred on the Belgian
Government by considerations of equity.
Therefore, since no jus standi before the Court had been established, the
Court refused to render a decision on any other aspect of the case.
Accordingly, the Court rejected the Belgian Government's claim by 15
votes to 1, twelve votes of the majority being based primarily on the
foregoing reasons.
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Court of Justice of the European Communities
In Commission of the European Communities vs Government of the
Italian Republic, Case 24/68, July 1, 1969; 7 C.M.L.Rev. (Jan. 1970) 72,
the Commission asked the Court of Justice to establish that Italy had failed
to comply with its obligations under Article 16 of the EEC Treaty, in
levying a so-called "statistical duty" on goods exported to other member
states, and that the Republic had also failed to comply with other treaty
obligations in levying such a duty on agricultural products subject to
common market organizations, and imported from other member states.
The Court, agreeing that Italy had failed to comply with its treaty obligations, held that (a) whether the "statistical duty" be regarded as one
general charge or as two different charges, one on imports and the other on
exports, is immaterial to its qualification under the treaty; (b) the effect of
the "statistical duty" is equivalent to that of a customs duty, and the
minimal amount thereof does not justify it, the only criterion being the
nature of the charge; and (c) the benefit resulting from the statistical
information was of such a general nature, and its evaluation so uncertain,
that the "statistical duty" could not be deemed compensation for a service
actually rendered.
Similar legal concepts were involved in Social Fonds voor de Diamantarbeiders,Antwerp vs S. A. Ch. Brackfeld & Sons and Chougol Diamond
Co., Consolidated Cases 2-3/69, July 1, 1969; 7 C.M.L.Rev. (Jan. 1970)
74. The Belgian social security fund for diamond workers was created as a
public fund, to which every importer of uncut diamonds is required to
contribute a percentage of the value of such diamonds. The King has the
right, however, to exempt from such contribution, uncut diamonds either
having a value not exceeding 300 BFr. per carat, or imported from the
Netherlands on the basis of the trade agreement between the Belgian and
Netherlands diamond industries. The Fund instituted these proceedings
against some 300 importers who refused to pay their contributions. In
answering the several questions submitted by the Vrederechter in his
request for a preliminary ruling, the Court followed its decision in the
Italian Republic case, supra, and added that (a) the obligations of Articles
9 and 12 are precise and clear, and their application are not subject to any
further action on the part of the Community or national authorities, so that
these dispositions create individual rights, which national courts are bound
to safeguard; (b) the treaty prohibits any tax between member states levied
on imports or exports, without regard to the nationality of the economic
agents who might suffer from such measures; and (c) with respect to the
common customs tariff, there are no rules in the treaty which explicitly
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prohibit taxes having equivalent effect on trade with third countries; and
while such taxes might possibly be detrimental to the aims pursued toward
the uniform application of the common customs tariff, the question whether
the freedom of member states in this field might be limited on the basis of
the treaty could arise only after the common customs tariff came into force.
In Firma Schwarzwaldmilch Gmbh vs Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle far

Fette, Case No. 4/68, July 11, 1968; Recueil XIV-4, p. 549, plaintiff, in
seeking to overturn the forfeiture of the bond which he had posted as
security for performance of his obligation to import nonfat dry milk from
France, pleaded force majeure within the meaning of Article 6, par. 2, of
Regulation No. 136/64, on the ground that the machinery in the powdered
milk department of his supplier broke down, thus preventing delivery of the
goods, and that the remaining time was too short to permit import from
another source except at a considerably higher price and substantial resulting loss, and without guarantee of quality.
The court rejected the importer's plea, holding that (a) the term "mechanical breakdown" as used in Article 6, par. 3(e) of the regulation does
not cover a breakdown of machinery designed for the production of goods,
but only methods of transportation; (b) "force majeure," which must be
construed according to the legal framework within which it is to produce its
effects, requires not only an extraordinary occurrence beyond the importer's control making timely import impossible, but also a showing that the
consequences, despite reasonable care, could have been avoided only at
unreasonable sacrifice; and (c) the regulation's list of various contingencies
which could be considered within the term "force majeure" was not exhaustive, and the courts of the Member States could find force majeure to
exist in other circumstances.
Franz V6lk vs S.P.R.L. Ets.J. Vervaecke, Case 5/69, July 9, 1969; 7

C.M.L.Rev. (Jan. 1970) 81. Under a written agreement, V61k granted Ets.
Vervaecke the exclusive right to sell the former's "Konstant" washing
machines, and agreed to protect defendant in its guaranteed sales territory,
while defendant agreed not to sell machines of any competitor. Plaintiff
averred that the defendant had violated the agreement, while defendant
contended that the "absolute territorial protection" clause rendered the
agreement null and void under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty. In response
to the request of the Oberlandesgericht(Court of Appeal) of Munich for a
preliminary ruling, the Court held that (a) to be capable of affecting trade
between member states, the agreement must, on the basis of a totality of
objective legal and de facto factors, permit one to anticipate with a
sufficient degree of probability that it might exercise such a direct or
indirect, and actual or potential, influence on trade currents between memInternationalLawyer, Vol. 4, No. 4
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ber states as to be harmful to the realization of the objectives of the
institution of a single market among States; (b) the prohibition of Art. 85,
para. 1, is applicable only when the agreement also has the object of effect
of preventing, restricting or distorting competition within the Common

Market; (c) an agreement is therefore not prohibited by that article, when
its influence on the market is insignificant because of the weak position of
the parties in the relevant market; and (d), thus, an "exclusive dealing
agreement," even embodying absolute territorial protection, is not prohibited by para. 1 of that article.
Australia
Bonser vs La Macchia, 43 Aust. L.J.R. 275 (Australia, High Ct., Sept.

30, 1969), 64 Am. J.Int. Law (April 1970) 435. Under date of October 16,
1967, hoping to obviate such litigation as ensued in the United States over
the distribution of continental-shelf resources between the federal and state
governments, an agreement was signed by the Australian Prime Minister
and the Premiers of the six states, distributing the oil and gas resources of
the Australian continental shelf. Under this agreement, the states were
granted authority to license and administer the exploration and exploitation
of resources in Australia's offshore areas. In the case under consideration,
defendant was charged with fishing some six-and-a-half miles from the
nearest point on the coast of New South Wales (which exercises jurisdiction over fisheries in a three-mile territorial sea), with a net of a smaller
mesh than that permitted under Federal legislation. His defense was predicated, in part, on the contention that the Federal Parliament did not have
the power to legislate with respect to fisheries more than three miles from
the coast or, in the alternative, that the constitutional power to legislate for
"fisheries in Australian waters beyond territorial limits" did not extend to
the waters in which he was fishing in alleged contravention of the legislation.
The court unanimously rejected defendant's contentions, relying primarily on the cases of Reg. vs Keyn (The Franconia)(1876) 2 Ex. D. 63,

holding that "at common law, the realm ended at the edge of the sea
and.., it did not extend to the bed of the sea, i.e., to any portion of the
earth's crust adjacent to the realm covered at low tide, nor did it extend to
the waters which washed the shores"; and Reference re Ownership of
Off-Shore Mineral Rights (1968), 65 D.L.R. (2nd) 353 (Supreme Court of

Canada), in which latter case, it was held that the territorial sea had not
become part of the adjacent Province of British Columbia. One of the
Justices expressed the ground for the court's decision, which accords with
that of Canada, as follows:
International Lawyer, Vol. 4, No. 4
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It is simply that territorial waters are an adjunct of territorial sovereignty:
and that all rights and interests in territorial waters arise as an attribute of that
sovereignty. Before federation, New South Wales was not a sovereign polity.
It was a British colony, a self-governing colony but not a sovereign body.
Upon federation it lost some of its powers of self-government, because of the
assignment to the new polity, the Commonwealth, of the capacity to make
laws on topics defined by the Constitution. Before federation, dominium and
imperium in the territorial sea adjacent to the British colony New South
Wales belonged to the British Crown as the sovereign of the colonial territory
in international law. That position was not altered by federation. The former
Australian colonies became States in the new Commonwealth; but of course
not sovereign States. That term is sometimes heard: but clearly it is wrong:
and nothing is added to political stature by a false description, which is
perhaps the result of a supposed analogy, obviously fallacious in law and in
historical fact, with the States of the United States of America.
France
Crddit Industriel et Commercial vs Cara;and Cie. Francaise de Cridit
et de Banque vs S.A.R.L. Atard Brothers (French Court of Cassation,
1969), Recueil Dalloz Sirey (1969), p. 341; VIII Int. Legal Materials
(Nov. 1969) 1206. The Cara brothers, owners of agricultural property in
Algeria, had overdrawn their account with the Comptoir d'Escompte de
Sid-Bel-Abbes, whose assignee was the Crdit Industriel et Commercial.
To settle this debt, one of the brothers had given seven bills of exchange
which were not paid at maturity. The Caras' property was expropriated
pursuant to an Algerian Decree of October 1, 1963. The bank subsequently sued the defaulting Cara brother in Nancy, France, where he
was then living, but the court dismissed the action on the ground that the
Decree of October 1, 1963, and various prefectorial implementing orders,
had brought about the "nationalization" of the assets of the brothers Cara
and that, as a result, the defacto association between the two brothers had
been relieved of the liabilities "which were assumed by the new juridicial
person (the Algerian State) which ought to be substituted for the obligor
according to the rules of international law implicitly acknowledged in the
Evian Agreements."
The court held that the Algerian decree declares as "assets of the state,"
only agricultural enterprises belonging to those persons who, at the date of
the decree, were not Algerian nationals or could not prove that they had
accomplished the legal formalities in order to acquire that nationality, and
is accordingly against French public policy set out in the Government
Statements of March 19, 1962 (approved in France by referendum and in
Algeria by self-determination vote), providing that no one can be deprived
of his property without prior determination of fair compensation. The
Court concluded that, in holding debtors discharged from their obligations
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 4, No. 4
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to creditors pursuant to a foreign law offensive to French public policy, the
Court of Appeals had violated the pertinent statutes, and the judgment
below was accordingly vacated and the case was remanded to the Court of
Appeals of Orl6ans.
In the Cie. Francaise de Cridit case, Atard Brothers & Co., which
operated a flour and semolina mill in Algeria, had on April I and 30, 1963,
signed two bills in favor of the predecessor of the plaintiff bank, the
balance of which had not been paid at maturity, whereupon the bank sued
the corporation and the individual Atards who had guaranteed the corporation's obligations. The court below held that the debt and the sureties had
been discharged, because an Algerian Decree of May 22, 1964 on the
nationalization of flour mills and semolina, pasta and couscous factories,
provided that assets, rights and obligations in their entirety are to be
transferred to the national enterprises replacing them, and that such a
transfer creates a right to compensation for which the national enterprises
are to be responsibile and which will be paid to the rightful claimants,
according to rules set out in a subsequent order.
On appeal, the Court of Cassation noted that "there is no need to
examine whether the Algerian legislation providing for the nationalization
of the Atard enterprise is or is not contrary to French public policy, for the
question is not one of giving effect to these statutes in France, but rather of
drawing the consequences in France in conformity with the French legislation of a juridical situation created in a foreign country in accordance with
foreign law", and that in this respect, "It is consistent with the principle set
forth in French law and therefore with public policy, that the liabilities of
nationalized enterprises follow their assets and are transferred to the national society"; and this transfer constitutes a novation which can be
invoked against the former creditor who is not given the option to accept
such a substitution since he is legally bound to recognize it.
However, the Court found that various provisions of the Algerian law
which left the Administration free to determine compensation within an
unspecified period of time and at its own discretion, providing for only a
ceiling which cannot be exceeded by the Administration, are contrary to
French public policy and that, therefore, is freeing the debtors of their
obligations to their creditors pursuant to a foreign law contrary to French
public policy, the Court of Appeals had violated the pertinent statutes,
requiring dismissal of the appeal and remand of the case to the Court of
Appeals of Amiens.
Netherlands
United States of America vs Bank voor Handel en Scheepvaart, N.V.,
International Lawyer, Vol. 4, No. 4
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Netherlands Supreme Court (Civil Chamber), October 17, 1969; summarized from Rechtspraak van de Week, Nov. 1, 1969, pp. 279-297. The
United States petitioned for reversal of a decision of the Court of Appeals
at The Hague, dated May 24, 1968 (Docket No. 81 R/65), in favor of Bank
voor Handel en Scheepvaart N.V. (the Bank), a corporation domiciled in
Rotterdam.
On October 20, 1942, the United States had seized, pursuant to the
Trading-with-the-Enemy Act, by vesting order No. 248, all the shares of
Union Banking Corporation (a New York corporation), owned by the
Netherlands N.V. Handelscompagnie Ruilverkeer, a subsidiary of the
Bank, as well as a claim which the Bank had on Union Banking Corporation. The United States liquidated the Union Banking Corporation. In
the course of the liquidation, the Union Banking Corporation paid to the
United States its above-mentioned debt, and transferred its remaining
assets to the United States. The appropriate authorities in the United
States have treated the Bank and the N.V. Handelscompagnie Ruilverkeer
as enemy subjects, since, in their opinion, by reason of direct or indirect
ownership of shares, these companies were under complete control of
Heinrich Thyssen-Bornemisza who was of Hungarian and/or German nationality; but the Bank and its subsidiary have not been considered enemy
subjects in the Netherlands within the meaning of the Dutch Decree on
Enemy Property. The United States, after the termination of hostilities,
neither returned the seized assets of the Netherlands companies nor indemnified those companies.
The Supreme Court first denied the existence of (a) any rule of international law prohibiting the Netherlands courts from passing on the
question whether a seizure by another state is in violation of international
law; (b) a more limited rule of international law, to the effect that the
Netherlands courts would not be allowed to rule on the validity under
international law of a seizure undertaken by another state, if the seized
assets were situated in the territory of the seizing state; and (c) the even
more limited rule, according to which such power would be denied to the
Netherlands courts, if it does not appear that the seizure is based on the
fact that the owners of the seized assets are Dutch or are domiciled in the
Netherlands or that, in any other way, Netherlands interests are also
affected by the seizure.
Turning to the merits, the Court held that the seizure-in view of the
provisions of the Trading-with-the-Enemy Act, as it read in 1942-did not
mean that the assets in question would never be returned to the owners;
but could only be characterized as a measure taken by the belligerent state
during hostilities, with respect to assets of subjects of an enemy state,
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 4, No. 4
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without thereby definitively destroying the rights of those subjects. Thus,
the United States had not- acted in violation of international law by the
seizure, assuming that the seized assets in fact belonged to an enemy
subject.
The Court then noted that the Netherlands Government has taken the
position-Law of July 20, 1951, Official Gazette No. 311 -that it is lawful
for the state to seek reparation from the assets of enemy subjects, even
when the treaty does not impose on the aggressor states the obligation to
compensate their subjects whose assets were expropriated.
Moreover, no rule of international law is violated by the United States
having designated for purposes of the Trading-with-the-Enemy Act, the
assets of the Bank and of N.V. Handelscompagnie Ruilverkeer as belong-

ing to an enemy subject when the companies were completely controlled
by an enemy subject; and it is irrelevant that the Bank and the N.V.
Handelscompagnie Ruilverkeer were not considered as enemy subjects by

the Netherlands authorities and that their assets were not enemy property
within the meaning of the Netherlands Decree on Enemy Property.
The Supreme Court accordingly reversed the decision of the Court of
Appeals at The Hague, and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals in
Amsterdam for further proceedings.
Rhodesia
In R. vs Ndhlovu and Others, 1968(4) S.A. 515 [R., A.D.], 19 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 166 (Jan. 1970), the Rhodesian Appellate Division refused to consider as res judicata, the holding of
the Privy Council (the supreme appellate tribunal for Southern Rhodesia
under the 1961 Constitution) in Madzimbamuto vs Lardner-Burke [ 1968] 3

All E.R. 561, that the Smith government was not the lawful government of
Rhodesia. Considering the matter anew, but applying the test (the "efficacy
of the change") adopted by the Privy Council to determine whether a
revolutionary government had become a lawful government, the court
concluded that sanctions did not result in the overthrow of the Smith
government and that there were no other factors which might succeed in
doing so. It was accordingly held that the 1961 Constitution must be
deemed annulled.
N.B.-The case of N.V. Cabolent vs National Iranian Oil Company

(Hague Court of Appeal, Nov. 28, 1968), a digest of which appeared in the
January 1970, issue of The International Lawyer (p. 409), is reported in
Nederlandse Jurisprudentie, 1969, No. 484, p. 1329; and IX International
Legal Materials (Jan. 1970) 152. The case of Industria Molitoria Imolese

et al. v. Council, Case No. 30/67, March 13, 1968, which was briefed in
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the April 1970, issue of The InternationalLawyer (p. 581), is reported in 2
CCH Common Market Reporter 8060; and the case of Beus v. Hauptzollamt Munchen, Case No. 5/67, March 13, 1968, a brief of which appears at
p. 582 of the same issue of The International Lawyer, is reported in 2
CCH Common Market Reporter 8061.
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